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Abstract: This study uses randomized field experiments conducted in Indonesia, Colombia and Ethiopia to 
evaluate the efficacy of the combination of goal-setting, self-help groups, and incentives as a poverty alleviation 
strategy. The experiment in each country had subjects randomly assigned to one of the five groups: 1) goal 
setting “goal”, 2) goal setting and group “group”, 3) goal setting and incentives “incentives”, 4) goal setting, 
group and incentives “FII” and 5) control group. Results show that the “goal” treatment has a positive and 
significant effect on income in Indonesia, the “incentives” treatment resulted in a positive and significant effect 
on income improvement in Ethiopia and Indonesia, the “FII” treatment is the only treatment that achieves 
economic outcome improvement in all the countries considered for this study. On the other hand, I detect no 
significant impact of the “group” treatment on the economic outcome variable in Ethiopia, Indonesia and 
Colombia.  The overall analysis of the study revealed strong evidence in the findings to suggest that the FII 
treatment could be a powerful tool for poverty alleviation in the developing countries. 
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I. Introduction 
     Billions of dollars have been spent on program interventions in developing countries, yet 1.2 
billion people are still living below $1.25 per day in personal income in developing countries 
(World Bank, 2013). Albeit many program interventions have been implemented for good 
intentions to address the issue of poor populations, they tend to not eradicate poverty for many 
reasons. One of the reasons could be the lack of motivation by participants to make change. This 
is due to the fact that most program interventions focus on the needs and deficits of the low-income 
people, but they ignore the initiative, motivation and the capacity the poor people have to make 
change. Nevertheless, an organization known as the Family Independence Initiative (FII) has 
found consistent success in improving the socio-economic status of the poor, where for many years 
government programs failed to do so, by creating a structure for low-income people to maximize 
their own abilities, resources and social networks. Maurice Lim Miller, the founder and CEO of 
the FII, was awarded the MacArthur Foundation’s Genius Award in 2012 for his contribution to 
the success of poor working families in United States.  
     The Family Independence Initiative is an Oakland, California based national non-profit 
organization that has innovated a new poverty alleviation strategy by using the amalgamation of 
goal setting, supportive social networks and providing incentives to increase economic outcome. 
By applying this new poverty alleviation tool, the FII shows that low-income households have the 
ingenuity and the capacity to guide themselves and their social networks out of poverty. The idea 
behind the FII approach is simple and cost effective. A low-income family who wants join the FII 
must select  six to eight low-income working families and self-organize into peer support groups. 
Then, the FII challenges the groups to set goals or to have clear directions that will lift them out 
of poverty.  Each member in a cohort sets individual goals and receives small cash rewards when 
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they report their progress or achieve their goals. The goal could be finding a job, opening a new 
business, saving, attending business training, improving kids’ grades, etc. The main purpose of the 
FII incentive scheme is to reward initiative and progress. Moreover, the FII encourages members 
of a self-help group to meet on a monthly basis to discuss obstacles they face, the progress they 
make to achieve their goals, and to share information and resources to help one another. Families 
who adopted this approach achieved substantial improvements. For example, results obtained from 
FII follow up study in Oakland, California showed that earning of the families increased by 27 
percent and homeownership increased by 40 percent in two years (FII, 2011). Could this new 
approach help eradicate poverty in developing countries? If so, which component is the most 
effective? 
     To examine whether the components of the FII model work in developing countries’ settings, 
I used randomized field experiments data conducted from three developing counties: Ethiopia, 
Indonesia and Colombia. The experiments in each of the three country sites were designed to test 
the ingredients of the FII approach. The experiments were a 2 X 2 design consisting of four 
treatment groups and one control group. Subjects were assigned to one of the five groups 
randomly. The first treatment group was “goal”. The rationale of this intervention is to test the 
goal setting elements of the FII model.  Each subject assigned to this treatment group was asked 
to set a personal goal. The goal was something they thought that could change their economic 
situation and it should have been verifiable.  The second treatment group was “group”. This 
intervention was aimed to examine the peer support component of the FII model. Subjects assigned 
to this treatment group were placed in small self-help groups and set individual goals. Members 
of the group were also required to meet and talk about the challenges and concerns they face to 
realize their goals, brainstorm solutions to the problems, share success stories and motivate one 
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another to make progress. The third treatment group was “incentive”. This intervention is to 
explore the incentive scheme components of the FII model. The participants who were assigned to 
this treatment set personal goals and they were not placed in a small group. They were told that 
they will only get incentives if they achieved their goals. The fourth treatment is “FII”. This 
intervention is the interaction of goal-setting, group and incentives. Subjects assigned to this 
treatment were placed in small peer support groups, and set personal goals. They were told that 
they would receive incentives only if they achieved their goals. The subjects assigned to control 
condition did not get any intervention. For each intervention, the outcome with regard to goal 
achievement and income were measured. The main purpose of this study is to test the components 
of Family Independence Initiative approach (FII) in developing countries. 
      The overall analysis of the study using three countries dataset revealed strong evidence in the 
findings to suggest that the FII treatment could be a powerful tool for poverty alleviation in the 
developing countries. 
     The next section presents literature review. Section III describes the experiments and the 
experimental design. Section IV provides the estimation strategies. Results are discussed in section 
V. conclusion and policy implications are presented in section VI. 
II. Literature Review  
     Since FII uses a combination of approaches such as goal setting, incentive and self-help groups 
to help low-income people to escape poverty, this section presents the literature review of each of 
FII model components.   
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Goal Setting 
     The first component of the FII model is setting a goal. FII challenges low-income people to set 
goals that will lift them out of a low standard of living. Lock and Lathan (2006) state that a goal is 
the aim of an action or task that a person consciously desires to achieve or obtain. Goal setting, 
then, is the process of establishing the level of performance so as to achieve a certain measurable 
result. Although goal setting for poverty alleviation is a new research idea for development 
economics, there exist a large body of literature on the power of goal setting on performance in 
psychology and management.  
     In review of studies conducted on different ranges of countries and settings over past thirty five 
years with close to hundred tasks over forty thousand participants, Lock and Latham (2002) noted 
that goal setting has been shown to increase performance. Goals can be self-elected, assigned by 
others and they can be set in cooperation with other participants. According to Dossett and 
Greenberg (1981), self-set goals result in higher performance and goal attainment as versus goals 
assigned by others. This makes sense because self-set goals are for the person who owns them. 
Furthermore, goal setting theory predicts that goal difficulty is a key issue.  Specific and difficult 
goals if accepted lead to higher levels of performance than do easy goals (Locke and Latham, 
2006). A study by Harding and Hsiaw (2014) on goal setting and energy conservation found that 
consumers who set realistic goals save considerable amount of energy. 
      Overall, the probability of goal achievement increases when people are involved in identifying 
and setting specific goals, and committed to their goals. Goal commitments can be motivated by 
the desire to reach an end result people expect because of working towards achieving their goals, 
or the belief people have on themselves that they can achieve the goal. It also driven by an 
incentive.  
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Incentive 
     The second component of the FII approach is an incentive. The FII provides incentives to low-
income people who adopted its approach when they report their progress or achieve their goals. 
Existing research indicates that providing rewards for goal attainment can increase effort and 
strengthen individuals’ goal commitment which can result in better performance (Predrgast 1999). 
The relative effects of cash incentives vs non-cash as described in the literature is mixed. Presslee 
et al. (2013) conducted quasi-experiments at five Financial Services Companies. Employees at two 
locations received cash incentive for goal achievement while employees at the three locations 
earned points equal to cash value incentive, redeemable for merchandise. They found that cash 
incentive resulted in better performance because employees who received cash reward selected 
relatively more difficult goals than employees who received tangible incentive. Conversely, 
Jeffery (2009) analyzed in a laboratory study the relative motivational power of cash vs non-cash 
rewards. He showed that employees who engaged in challenging mental tasks performed better in 
pursuit of tangible rewards than cash rewards of equal value.  On the other hand, Shaffer and Arkes 
(2009) examined in experiments the preference reversal in evaluation of cash versus non-cash 
rewards.  They found cash versus tangible reward type has no significant impact difference on 
performance. In another study, Knight et al (2001) stated that when providing incentives are 
conditional upon goal achievement, rational decision makers will clearly prefer to minimize the 
risk of losing the reward whenever possible so that they can maximize their chances of getting the 
reward. 
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Self-help groups 
     The third component of the FII model is self-help groups. Anne et al. (2011) reported that a 
family who is willing to join the FII must recruit six to eight other families who want to make 
improvement in their standard of living and form self-helping groups. Studies show that Self- 
groups play a key role in socio-economic activities. Kalra et al. (2013) carried out a case study in 
India on two self-help groups engaged in agricultural activities. They noted that self-help groups 
have the potential to contribute to economic development by empowering its member through 
skills, knowledge, and social networking. Kilpatrick et al (2003) stated that self-groups where 
members share common values and visions and take on responsibilities within the group including 
leadership are important to group development. Moreover, the characteristics of group members 
are important for group effectiveness.  For example, Huppi and Feder (1990) examined the roles 
of groups in rural lending and indicated that the group lending to be successful, groups have to be 
homogenous and jointly liable. 
     In conclusion, several studies have been done on goal setting, incentives and self-help groups 
separately, to my knowledge there is no research has examined the power of goal setting, self-help 
groups and incentives together as a poverty reduction strategy. This study addresses this gap by 
using randomized field experiments data from developing countries.   
III. The Experiment  
     In this section, I describe the interventions, the study sites, the basic experimental setup and 
randomization design and, the timing of the experiments. The study took place in three developing 
countries, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Colombia. The experiments in each country were designed to 
test   the FII model components. The three main ingredients that the FII approach innovated to 
encourage the low-income families to use their own resources or capabilities to break the poverty 
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cycle are: Goal-setting, self-help groups, and incentives. Considering these key ingredients in to 
account, four interventions were examined and named as follows: Goal-setting “goal”, goal-setting 
and self-help-groups “groups”, goal-setting and incentives “incentives”, and goal-setting, self-help 
groups and incentives “FII”. Table 1 shows the basic experimental design and the interventions.  
The Interventions 
     The “goal” intervention is common to all the treatments, it is intended to test the goal setting 
element of the FII model.  The FII challenges participants to set goals they thought change their 
socio-economic status. It could be opening a new business, saving, improving kids’ school 
performance, attending business training etc. Similarly, in the experiments subjects assigned to the 
“goal” treatment were asked to set life-changing goals. The goals should measureable and 
provable. 
     The “group” intervention is aimed at to examine the peer support group component of the FII 
approach. A Family that is willing to adopt the FII is required self-select six to eight other families 
and form a small group.  The importance of forming self-help group to members is to share 
problems and achievements, give advice one another, and strengthen social ties and friendships. 
Likewise, in the experiments subjects assigned to this treatment were placed in small support 
groups. Group members set personal goals and they are allowed to turn one another for help, 
inspiration, and share resources. 
     The “incentives” intervention is designed to explore the incentives for reporting progress aspect 
of the FII approach. The FII provides small cash reward` when families report their progress or 
achieve their goals. In this study, individuals assigned to this intervention set personal goals and 
they were also told that they would receive incentives if the realize their goals. The “FII” 
intervention is the interaction of the above three treatments. 
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The study conducted in three different sites: Medellin, Addis Ababa and Jakarta. 
Medellin, Colombia 
     The Municipality of Medellin is the second largest city in Colombia, with an estimated 
population of 2.44 million. The field experiment in Medellin was conducted by University of San 
Francisco (USF) students, partnered with The Bank of Opportunities (the biggest financial 
institution in Medellin). The participants in the experiment were low-income people who own 
small businesses.  
     The bank picked 250 clients to participate in the study from its different programs. However, 
150 clients showed-up for the first orientation meeting. The researchers explained the purpose of 
the study to the participants to obtain their agreement, and then obtained their agreement. 
Participants were asked to fill out orientation surveys. This survey asked for contact details, 
personal information, and household and business characteristics.  The experiment was a five-
group design consisting of four treatment groups and two control groups. The study occurred 
between June and December 2012 and comprised 7 follow-up meetings once every four weeks, in 
six phases. In the first follow-up meeting, participants filled-out a baseline survey and subjects 
were randomly assigned to four treatment groups and one baseline control group. The investigators 
also recruited and end-line control group in order to test any bias that arose in case of diffusion of 
information between the treatment groups and the baseline control group. 
     In the baseline control condition (n=19), this group was a pure control group. Subjects to this 
group did not set any goal, did not form a group, and did not get incentives, but they were required 
to fill out baseline, mid-point and end-line surveys. They received $13 per survey as a 
compensation for their time and transportation expenses. The end-line control (n=21) was also a 
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pure control group they were only required to fill out the end-line survey and received the same 
compensation per survey as the baseline control group. 
     In the “goal” treatment group (n=23), all subjects set individual goals. Based on the orientation 
meeting and survey, the investigators were able to come up with fourteen measurable goals. These 
subjects were required to select one new goal from the fourteen goals every four weeks over a total 
of six phases. At the end of every four weeks, the information on goal attainment and sales income 
was collected. These Individuals received $17 per survey as compensation for filling out goal 
related surveys, regardless of whether they achieved their goal or not. Some of the goals subjects 
chose were; attend and complete at least one of workshops in marketing and sales, and save at least 
$ 15,000 Colombian pesos (8 USD) every week for next four weeks in a savings account etc. The 
goal achievement verifications for attending at least one workshop were to show registration 
receipt and completion of certificate. Method of verification for saving goal was to present a bank 
statement. 
     In the “group” treatment (n=29), subjects were placed in a small self-help groups. The average 
number per group was 15 individuals. The self-help groups met every four weeks during the 
follow-up meeting to discuss goals and ways to help each other. At the end of every four weeks, 
information on goal achievements and their performance on sales income was measured and they 
set new goals for the next period. The subjects in this groups were compensated $17 per survey 
for filling out goal related survey, regardless of whether they achieved their goal or  not. 
    In the “incentives” treatment (n=29), participants set personal goals. They were not placed in a 
small groups. They were told that they would receive monetary incentives only if they achieved 
their goals. At the end of each phase, data on goal attainment and sales income was collected, and 
they set new goals for next phase. The reward was $19 if they achieved their goals or $3 if not. 
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     In the “FII” treatment (n=27), subjects set goals and they were placed in a small self-help 
groups. They also told they would receive monetary incentive of $19 if they achieved their goals, 
if not they only receive $3. At the end of every four weeks, information with regard to goal 
achievement and monthly sales income was measured. Then, they set another new goal for the 
next phase.  
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
     Addis Ababa is the capital city of Ethiopia and where the African Union is based. It is also the 
largest city in the country, with an estimated population of 3.39 million. The field experiment in 
Ethiopia was conducted by USF students in collaboration with The Bureau of Labor and Social 
Affairs (BOLSA). The study was conducted at five different sites in Addis Ababa: ALERT, 
HAGER, FURNITURE, GASHA and ENDAD. These sites are the place where physically 
disabled people either work, meet, reside or get different kinds of trainings. The researchers talked 
about the research idea to all of the participants invited for orientation meetings at each sites and 
obtained their agreement to participate in the study. The participants in the experiment were low-
income physically disabled persons.  
     As in Colombia, the experiment was a five -group design consisting of four treatment groups 
and one control group. The study was conducted between June 2013 and August 2013 and 
comprised five follow-up meetings once every week, in two phases. In first follow-up meeting, 
participants filled out baseline survey and subjects were assigned to four treatment groups and one 
control group on the basis of random assignments to sites. The researchers did not randomize at 
individual levels to avoid spillover from one group to another, because most of the subjects at each 
site work in the same location. 
12 
 
     In the control condition (n=24), this group was a pure control group. Subjects in this group did 
not set any goals, did not form a group and did not get incentives. However, they were required to 
fill out baseline and end-line surveys. In the “goal” treatment group (n=13), all subjects set 
individual goals. Unlike Colombia, they set any goal they thought would change their economic 
condition. Also, subjects were not required to change their goals for the next phase. It was up to 
them, they could re-use their first goals or set different goals.  Every two weeks, the information 
on goal attainment and bi-weekly income were collected. Some of the goal participants chose 
includes; Sell 100 socks in two weeks, and make 320 Ethiopian Birr by doing shoe shining etc. 
The goal attainment verification method for these examples were to present sales receipts with 
date and customer phone number. In the “group” treatment (n=20), subjects were placed in small 
groups. The average number per self-help group was 5 individuals. The groups met every week 
during the follow-up meeting to discuss goals and ways to help each other.  Every two weeks, 
information on goal achievements and their income was measured, and set another goal for the 
next two weeks. In the “incentives” treatment (n=16), subjects set individual goals, and did not 
form self-help groups.  They were told that they would receive incentives only if they achieved 
their goals. Unlike Colombia, the incentives were tangible items like spatula, eating plate, pan etc. 
Every two weeks, performance on bi-weekly income and goal achievement information was 
collected. In the “FII” treatment (n=13), subjects assigned in this treatment set goals, and were 
placed in self-help groups. Group members met and discussed every week during the follow-up 
sessions. They were also told that they would receive non-cash incentives only if they achieved 
their goal. Every two weeks bi-weekly income and goal achievement data was collected. 
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Jakarta, Indonesia 
       Jakarta is the capital city of Indonesia. It is also the largest city in the country, with an 
estimated population of 10.176 million. The field experiment in Jakarta was conducted in 
collaboration with Child Survival Program (CSP). The CSP provides nutritional assistance to 
mothers and babies. In addition, CSP offers health and business related trainings to mothers. Many 
groups of mothers attend the programs at the CSP centers. Each group consists of 10-15 mothers. 
These groups were the ideal candidates to test the component of the FII approach. The CSP invited 
these groups to an orientation meeting. The researcher explained purpose of the study to these 
groups of mothers during the orientation meeting and obtained their agreement to participate in 
the project.  
       As in Colombia and in Ethiopia, the experiment was a five -group design consisting of four 
treatment groups and one control group. The study was conducted during the summer of 2012 and 
comprised five follow-up meetings once every week, in two phases. In first follow-up meeting, 
participants filled out baseline survey and ten of the mother groups were assigned to four treatment 
groups and one control group on the basis of group level randomization. 
     In the control condition (n=19), Subjects did not set any goals, did not form a group and did 
not get incentive but they were required to fill out baseline and end line surveys. In the “goal” 
treatment group (n=38), all subjects set individual goals for two weeks. As in Ethiopia, they set 
any goal they thought would change their economic condition. After two weeks, the information 
on goal attainment and bi-weekly income were collected. Unlike Colombia and Ethiopia, these 
subjects in this treatment groups randomly assigned to a different treatment other than “goal” 
treatment for the next phase (two weeks). This treatment could be the “group”, or the “incentives” 
or the “FII”. Some of the activities selected for goal setting in Indonesia includes: Babysitting, 
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barber, etc.  In the “group” treatment (n=31), subjects were placed in small groups. The average 
number per self-help group was 10-15 individuals. The groups met every week during the follow-
up meeting to discuss goals and ways to help each other. After the end of the two weeks, 
information on goal achievements and their income was measured, and another treatment other 
than “group” treatment was assigned for the next two weeks. In the “incentives” treatment (n=41), 
subjects set individual goals, and did not form self-help groups.  They were told that they would 
receive non-cash incentives only if they achieved their goal. At the end of the two weeks, 
performance on bi-weekly income and goal achievement information was collected and another 
treatment was assigned.  In the “FII” treatment (n=45), subjects assigned to this treatment set goals, 
and were placed in self-help groups. Group members met and discussed every week during the 
follow-up sessions. They were told that they would receive non-cash incentives only if they 
achieved their goal. At the end of the two weeks, bi-weekly income and goal achievement data 
was collected, and another treatment was assigned for the next phase. 
      The difference in number of subjects across groups for each country mostly is due to attrition. 
I carried-out a drop out analysis to see the treatment groups and the control group are comparable 
by comparing the final sample size between control and treatment groups for countries considered 
for this study on the key variables. I find no significant difference between the comparison group 
and the treatment groups for each country except age in Ethiopia. To control for any pre-treatment 
differences between the control and treatment groups, I will include key baseline variables in the 
regressions analysis. 
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IV. Estimation Strategy 
     To evaluate the causal effects of the interventions, I specify four models. The first two models 
(equation (1) and equation (2)) measure the effects of treatments on goal achievement. 
Specifically, equation (1) estimates goal achievement for Indonesia, Ethiopia and Colombia 
separately whereas equation (2) estimates goal attainment for three the countries together. The last 
two models (equation (3) and equation (4)) measure the impacts of treatments on economic 
outcome variables for each country individually and the three countries jointly.  
The goal achievement model for Ethiopia, Indonesia and Colombia is specified as follows; 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                         (1) 
Where the dependent variable  𝑌𝑖𝑡  represents mean goal attainment. The variable goal achievement 
measures only two possible values: 0 (failure to achieve goal) and 1(success to achieve goal). 𝐵0 
is the constant term. 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 is a an indicator variable for assignment to ‘group’ treatment. 
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡   is   a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if  the participant is assigned to ‘incentive’ 
treatment. 𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡  is another indicator variable  assigned    to ‘FII’ treatment . X is a vector of controls 
which includes age and gender. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error term.  
The goal achievement model for the three countries is specified as follows 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋 + 𝜋𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                (2)                                                                                                               
     The variable descriptions are the same as equation (1) except that this model includes country 
dummies (𝜋𝑐 ).  The dataset in each country treated as an average per individual instead of a panel 
for consistency.   
     I run Ordinary Lease Square (OLS) regression for equation (1) and equation (2). In the above 
two models, the control groups are excluded from the analysis since they did not set goals. 
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However, I can still compare the effects of treatments on average goal achievement between 
treatment groups since subjects  were assigned to the four treatments groups are comparable due 
to  random assignment. Hence, the difference in probability of goal achievement between the 
treatment groups is the effect of the treatments. 
The economic outcome model for each country specified is as follows; 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                        
      The dependent variable Y represents standardized average weekly income. 𝐵0 is the intercept 
term, while group, incentive, FII and goal are dummy variables representing the treatments, X is 
the vector of covariates which includes age, gender and baseline income, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error term.  
The economic outcome model for the three countries specified as follows; 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋 + 𝜋𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                        (4) 
     The variables description of this model is similar to equation (3) except that country dummies 
have been included in this model. 
The economic outcome variables observations from each country have been standardized to make 
all of the economic outcome variables comparable between countries by using the following 
formula.   
𝑌𝑖𝑗,1𝜎 =
𝑌𝑖𝑗 − ?̅?𝑠
𝜎𝑌,𝑠
                                                                                                                                           (5) 
     Where 𝑌𝑖𝑗,1𝜎  is the standardized value of the economic outcome variable to one standard 
deviation for data point i for country j, 𝑌𝑖𝑗 each data point for country j, ?̅?𝑠 the average of all sample 
observation for country j and 𝜎𝑌,𝑠 is the sample standard deviation of all sample observation for 
country j. 
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      The main advantage of standardizing the economic outcome variables distributions is to make 
each country’s economic outcome variable distribution the same. When these distribution are 
standardized, they will have a mean zero and a standard deviation of one and the economic 
outcome from each country can be directly compared.  However, the transformation of unscaled 
variable into standardized values does not change the shape of the original distribution and it does 
not change the location of each observation relative to the others observations in the distribution. 
The sign of the standardized values indicates whether the value of the outcome variable is located 
above the mean when it is positive, located below the mean when it is negative and equal to the 
mean when it is zero. 
V. Results 
The effects of Treatments on goal achievement  
     Figure1 shows the proportion of goal achievement for Indonesia, Colombia and Ethiopia under 
different treatments. Only considering “goal” treatment, 86 percent of the subjects achieved their 
goals in Indonesia, 89 percent in Colombia and 65 percent in Ethiopia. Looking at the “incentives” 
treatment, 92 percent of the participants achieved their goals in Colombia, 86 percent in Indonesia 
and 75 in Ethiopia. Focusing on only FII treatment, the share of goal achievements are, 96 percent, 
96 percent and 88 percent in Colombia, Indonesia and Ethiopia respectively.   The percentage of 
goal achievement is the highest for “FII” treatment. The proportion of goal achievement of subjects 
in the group treatment is the lowest in the three countries compared to the other three treatments. 
The proportion of goal achievements are 76 percent, 61 percent and 62 percent in Colombia, 
Indonesia and Ethiopia respectively. 
     The empirical approach estimates the effects of the four treatments on goal achievement using 
each country dataset separately and combined. Table 2 reports estimates of “goal achievement” in 
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equation (1) and equation (2) using Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation technique. Since 
all the treatments are dummy variables, the “goal” treatment is used as the reference category and 
all of the other treatments are compared to the “goal” treatment.   
     The purpose of the “group” treatment is to assess the effects of self-help groups on the 
member’s performance for goals achievement. Studies predict that self-help groups have the 
advantage of empowering its members by pooling ideas, skills, and resources, and by motivating 
each other to achieve better results. The results obtained in this study indicated mutual support 
groups have the opposite impact. The coefficients of “group” treatment on goal achievement is 
either significant and negative or insignificant.   The “group” treatment is negative and statistically 
insignificant in Ethiopia and Colombia, but it is statistically significant and negative in Indonesia 
(where all of the participants were women) at 5 percent significance level.  Using the three 
countries data together, the coefficient of “group” treatment carries a negative sign and it is 
insignificant at 5 percent significance level.  A possible explanation for this unexpected result is 
in the FII model families self-select one another to form peer support group whereas in the 
experiments participants were placed in the “group” treatment randomly. Therefore, there is a 
possibility that participants placed in the groups do not know each other well, or lack sense of 
belonging and a common vison.  
     Economic theory predicts that   incentives are a powerful tool for goal attainment as they induce 
efforts towards goal achievement.  For example, Predrgast (1999) stated that providing rewards 
for goal attainment can increase effort and strengthen individuals’ goal commitment which can 
result in better performance. The present study result is consistent with the theory and my 
expectation for Ethiopia. The coefficient of “incentive” is positive and significant at 10 percent 
significance level. The results for Indonesia and Colombia are contrary to my expectation .The 
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estimates of “incentive “for Indonesia and Colombia are positive, but it is statistically insignificant. 
Overall, using the three countries dataset, the estimates of “incentive” is significant at 10 percent 
significance level.   
     The estimates of the “FII” treatment (which is the amalgamation of goal, self-help groups and 
incentives) are significant and positive for Colombia and Ethiopia at 1 percent significance level. 
However, the result for Indonesia is positive but insignificant. The result of the “FII” treatment for 
the three countries is significant at 10 percent significance level. The overall analysis of goal 
attainment using the combined dataset reveal that the “FII” treatment has the highest   probability 
of goal achievement. 
The effects of treatments on economic outcome 
     First, I will estimate the effects of the four treatments on economic outcome using each country 
dataset separately and then combining the countries datasets.  Since I have four treatment groups 
and one comparison group for each country, I can evaluate the difference in impact between the 
treatment groups and the control group with respect to the “goal” treatment, the “group” treatment, 
the “incentive” treatment and the “FII” treatment because of the random assignment. The main 
aspect of interest is to see whether the “FII” intervention has improved the economic outcome 
variable. Table 3 presents the estimates of   the effects of the different treatments on standardized 
income variables after controlling for age, gender, and baseline income and country dummies. I 
estimate equation (3) and equation (4) using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. 
     Goal setting is the key component of the interventions, it is common for all of the treatments. 
Goal setting theory predicts that there is a positive association between goal and performance 
(Lathan & Lock, 2007). Moreover, prior research found that goal setting has larger impact on 
performance than non-goal-setting situations. (Ivancevich & Mcmahon, 1982). Consitent with the 
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the theory, the estimate for “goal” treatment for Indonesia shows postitive results at the 5 percent 
singificance level. Wheras the coeficients of “goal’ treatment  for Ethiopia  and Colombia  are 
negative  but insignificant. Overall, using the three countries dataset  the goal treatment coficient  
is significant at a 10 percent singificance level. 
     The self-help groups can benefit each other through counseling, sharing skills and information, 
and giving advice. This analysis again shows surprising results for the “group” treatment. This 
intervention failed to have any positive and significant impact on economic outcome variable in 
Ethiopia, Colombia and Indonesia. Moreover, the three countries regression analysis result 
indicates the estimates of “group” treatment is positive but insignificant. 
     Result for “incentive” treatments for economic outcome are mixed. The estimates of 
“incentive” treatments are positive and statistically significant in Ethiopia and Indonesia at 5 
percent significance level fits with prior research by (Jeffery 2009). On the other hand, there was 
no effect obtained for “incentive” treatment for Colombia with respect to sales income 
performance during the intervention. 
      The FII follow-up study on hundreds of families who adopted the FII approach in various cities 
in United States show that the families’ income has consistently jumped over 20 percent in two 
years (FII, 2011). Similarly, in this study the “FII” estimates are positive and significant at a 1 
percent significance level in Ethiopia, at a 5 percent significance level in Colombia and at a 10 
percent significance level in Indonesia.  The “FII” group achieves superior economic outcome 
improvements compared to “goal”, “group” and “incentive treatments in Colombia, while the 
“incentive” group achieved highest income increase in Indonesia and Ethiopia.  The three countries 
regression result also reveal that the “FII” treatment is significant at 5 percent significance level. 
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In general, the “FII” treatment is the only intervention that is positive and significant for each 
country and the three countries as a whole. 
VI. Conclusion and Policy Implication 
     This study uses randomized field experiments conducted in Indonesia, Colombia and Ethiopia 
to evaluate the efficacy of the components of the Family Independence Initiative model as a 
poverty alleviation strategy in developing countries. The FII encouraged the poor to utilize their 
own abilities and resources to break the cycle of poverty by using the power of goal setting, self-
help groups and incentives. The FII has been successful in eradicating poverty. 
     To test the FII approach, a five-group experiment was designed in each country, and subjects 
were randomly assigned to one of the five groups named as follows: 1) goal-setting “goal”, 2) 
goal-setting and group “group”, 3) goal-setting and incentives “incentives”, 4) goal-setting, group 
and incentives “FII” and 5) control group. I examined the effects of the treatment on goal 
achievement and economic outcome. 
     The goal achievement estimation model did not include the control group because this group 
did not set any goal. The goal achievement variable takes two values: 1 if the subjects achieved 
their goals and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable (average goal achievement) measures the 
mean goal accomplishment throughout the interventions for each treatment.  The “goal” dummy 
variable is suppressed and all other treatments are compared to it. The economic outcome models 
measure the impacts of treatments on economic outcome variables for each country individually 
and the three countries as a whole.  
     The findings of the “group” treatment are surprising. The results show that groups without 
incentive made either negative or no contribution to members’ goal realization and economic well-
being. The “group” treatment has no impact on goal accomplishment in Ethiopia and Colombia 
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(where the treated groups consists of male and female participants), but it has a negative effect on 
goal achievement in Indonesia (where the treated groups consists of only female participants). 
Moreover, I detect no significant result for this intervention with respect to the economic 
performance for the countries considered for this study. The basic reason for the lack of positive 
impact for the “group” intervention is that subjects were placed in small support groups randomly 
in the experiments, as opposed to the self-select support groups approach in the FII model.  As a 
result, there is a possibility that participants placed in the group did not know each other well, or 
lack a sense of belonging, trust and a common vison. Furthermore, the existing studies suggest that 
the self-help groups to be successful, the group members should have been self-selected and 
homogenous (Gomez 2005; Huppi and Feder 1990).  
     The result shows that the “goal” treatment has a positive and significant effect on the economic 
outcome variable in Indonesia, but it is statistically insignificant in Colombia and Ethiopia. The 
positive outcome of “goal” intervention is in line with the basic concept of the goal-setting theory 
of motivation and the studies that has found goal-setting alone has a power to influence motivation, 
goal commitment and organizational performance (Wright 2007; Ivancevich & Mcmahon 1982).  
The significant result for the “goal” treatment without group and incentive is encouraging because 
it shows that goal commitments can be motivated by the desire to reach an end result people expect 
for working towards achieving their goals.  
      There is sufficient strength in the finding to suggest that incentive schemes can play a great 
role in influencing income.   The “incentives” treatment is resulted in a positive and significant 
effect on income improvement in Ethiopia and Indonesia (where the participants received non-
monetary incentives). The “incentives” treatment has no impact with regard to goal achievement 
and income generation in Colombia (where the participants received monetary incentives).  
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Providing incentive is more powerful when it is interacted with goal-setting and group. The “FII” 
is the only treatment that achieves economic outcome improvement in all the countries considered 
for this study. Overall, there is strong evidence in the findings to suggest that the FII treatment 
could be a powerful tool for poverty alleviation in the developing countries. 
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Table 1 Experimental design and the interventions 
 
 
       
Treatment groups Num. of participants in each 
Country 
Interventions 
  Colombia Indonesia  Ethiopia    Set 
goals 
Placed in a 
small groups 
Received 
incentives 
“Goal”       23 38 13     
“group”       29 31      20      
“incentives” 29 31 16      
“FII” 27 45 13       
Control 19 19 24    
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1  Proportion of Goal Achievement per Country for Each Treatment Group 
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  Table 2:  Impacts on Goal Achievement  
  Dependent Variable:  Mean Goal Achievement 
  ---OLS Estimations, standard errors are in parentheses---  
 
Variables Ethiopia 
Indonesi
a 
Colombi
a 
3 Countries 
 
 
          
 
Num. of Observations N=55 N=155 N=107 
 
N=317 
 
 
 Intercept 0.709    0.757 0.719   0.685     
  (0.174)***   0.163)***   0.092)***  (0.084)***    
       
 Group -0.068 -0.250   -0.075   -0.155   
  (0.127)   0.086)*** (0.064) (0.051)***  
       
 Incentives 0.218  0.056    0.072  0.088     
  (0.121)*   ((0.080)   (0.064)   (0.050)*    
       
 FII 0.344  0.022    0.175   0.120     
  (0.128)*** (0.078)   0.064)*** (0.049)**    
       
 Age -0.002   0.003     0.002   0.002     
 
 
(0.004)   
 
(0.004)   
 
(0.002)    
 
(0.002)   
 
 
 
 Colombia    0.062     
     (0.053)  
 Indonesia    0.072     
 
    
(0.049) 
  
  R2  0.22    0.10 0.15 0.11   
 * p≤.1; ** p≤.05; *** p≤.01 
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Table 3: Economic Outcome 
  Dependent Variable: Standardized Weekly Income 
  ---OLS Estimations, standard errors are in parenthesis--- 
 Variables Ethiopia Indonesia Colombia 3 Countries   
          
 Num. of 
Observations N=84 N=173 N=125 
 
N=382 
 
 
        
 Intercept -0.954     -2.270      -0.651      -0.871  
  0.199)***    0.473)***    (0.357)*    (0.251)***  
 Goal -0.063      0.737      -0.126      0.259  
  (0.110) (0.279)***     (0.255)      (0.163)  
       
 Group 0.185      0.442      -0.286     0.187   
  (0.113)   (0.305)      (0.237)     (0.162)  
       
 Incentives 0.420     0.763      -0.153     0.396     
  (0.111)***    (0.279)***    (0.239)      (0.159)**    
       
 FII 0.413      0.507      0.486     0.442     
  0.105)***    (0.270)*     (0.239)** 0.159)***    
       
 Female  0.060       0.089      0.144  
 
 
 (0.081)      
  
(0.156) (0.134) 
 
 
 
 Age 0.001      0.036      -0.002      0.000     
  
Initial income 
(0.003)   
0.036      
(0.012)*** 
0.000      
(0.007)    
0.004      
(0.005)  
0.023   
 
 
 
 
(0.002)***            
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)***    0.000)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 Colombia    -0.658     
     (0.149)***  
 Indonesia    0.221    
 
    
(0.152)***  
  
  R2  0.92   0.47 0.40 0.35   
 * p≤.1; ** p≤.05; ***  p≤.01 
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